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Abstract 
In this article, we consider the implications of the  ‘WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ? ƐƚƌĂŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-
terrorism strategy for the UK state ?s engagement with Muslims. We argue that the logics of Prevent 
have been highly problematic for state-Muslim engagement. Nevertheless, we suggest that the 
characterisation of state approaches to engaging Muslims as a form of discipline is incomplete 
without an analysis of: firstly, differences in practices, habits and perspectives across governance 
domains; secondly, variations in approach and implementation between levels of governance; and 
thirdly, the agency of Muslims who engage with the state. Through this approach we show how 
attention to the situated practices of governance reveals the contested nature of governing through 
Prevent. 
Key words 
Muslims, participatory governance, Prevent, counter-terrorism 
Introduction 
The previous New Labour government, through the Prevent strand of its counter-terrorism 
 ‘KEd^d ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ, developed a  ‘hearts and minds ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-terrorism that emphasised 
partnering and engagement with Muslim communities. A dominant theme of the academic 
literature analysing the significance of Prevent and counter-terrorism policies has been the 
contention that these led to the securitisation of ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ DƵƐůŝŵƐ, with 
participatory initiatives being introduced with the purpose of disciplining Muslim communities, or 
domesticating British Islam, in the process constituting Muslims as Ă ‘ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? (Pantazis 
and Pemberton, 2009) and  ‘conditional citizens ? (McGhee, 2008). A number of studies (Birt, 2008; 
Martin, 2014; Heath-Kelly, 2013), drawing on theories of governmentality, have highlighted the 
disciplinary nature of state engagement with Muslims, manifested particularly in the enmeshing of 
security and integration policies and increasing state regulation of Muslim conduct across areas of 
social, cultural and religious life. 
In this article, we consider the implications of Prevent for the UK state ?s engagement with Muslims 
more broadly. In so doing, we argue that the logics of the Prevent strategy have been highly 
problematic for state-Muslim engagement. Nevertheless, we argue that the characterisation of state 
approaches to engaging with Muslims as a form of discipline is incomplete without an analysis of: 
firstly, differences in practices, habits and perspectives across governance domains; secondly, 
variations in approach and implementation between levels of governance; and thirdly, the agency of 
Muslims who engage with the state. Through this approach we show how attention to the situated 
practices of participatory governance approaches to counter-terrorism reveals the messy and 
contested nature of governing through Prevent. 
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Our analysis of the practices of governing through Prevent is based on research carried out for the 
Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance ƐƚƵĚǇ ?K ?dŽŽůĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ?).1 This study examined 
policies and practices of state engagement with Muslims, their implications for Muslim civil society 
organisations, and Muslim responses to governing agendas, at national and local levels from 1997 to 
2013. In particular, we analysed three policy domains where government has increasingly recognised 
or engaged with Muslims: equalities and diversity policies where recognition of religious, and 
Muslim, difference and identities has come increasingly to the fore; participatory approaches to 
welfare delivery and service provision where faith-based, including Muslim, organisations have 
emerged as key partners or stakeholders; and security and counter-terrorism, which has involved a 
Muslim community engagement strand as a key element of the Prevent strategy. Our study was 
based on policy analysis and 112 semi-structured interviews with government and Muslim civil 
society actors working at the national level and in three local case-study areas of Birmingham, 
Leicester and Tower Hamlets. Our sample included representatives from national civil society 
organisations active on issues relating to Muslims (e.g. Cordoba Foundation, Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB), An-Nisa Society and Quilliam), civil servants and political advisors in government 
departments, including the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG), politicians, and local government, faith and Muslim civil 
society actors in Birmingham, Leicester and Tower Hamlets.
2
 Our interviews featured generic 
questions on the nature and quality of state-Muslim engagement, supplemented by questions 
tailored to ŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ?ĂƌĞĂƐŽĨǁŽƌŬĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ.3 Our data enable us to consider the logics 
and practices of state engagement with Muslims across policy arenas, and at different levels of 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ PǁŚĂƚŝŵƉĂĐƚĚŝĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚDƵƐůŝŵƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
the prism of counter-terrorism have on its engagement with Muslims more broadly?  
In the next section we outline the core components of the Prevent strategy before turning to read 
the implications of this strategy through two conceptualisations of governance through which 
Prevent has been interpreted: one as a disciplinary mode of regulation and the other as contested 
practice.  
Engagement through Prevent 
The Prevent strategy that was unveiled in 2007 in response to the 2005 London bombings was 
ĨƌĂŵĞĚĂƐĂ  ‘Śearts and minds ? approach to countering al-Qaeda-inspired domestic terrorism. The 
provenance of Prevent rests in a broader strategy cumulatively developed since 9/11. Known as 
CONTEST, and launched in 2003, this contained four components including: Pursue (surveillance and 
detection); Prepare (civil emergency contingency planning); Protect (domestic security); and Prevent 
 ?ƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐ  ‘ƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚŝƐ ůĂƐƚ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂƐŵŽƐƚ ŽǀĞƌƚůǇ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
Muslim communities.  
dŚĞWƌĞǀĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĚĂĞŶƚĂŝůĞĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƐŚŝĨƚƐ ŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚDƵƐůŝŵƌĞůigious, civil 
ĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ‘WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐsŝŽůĞŶƚǆƚƌĞŵŝƐŵ ?  ?Ws ?Žƌ  ‘WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ? ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐĨocused 
on Muslim community engagement and capacity-building, with a particular focus on theological, 
youth ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ and counter-radicalisation projects. Thus, the New Labour government set out to 
develop theologically-based counter-narratives to al-Qaeda ideology by funding the Radical Middle 
Way project, and facilitating the creation of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board 
(MINAB) to create a UK-based system of mosque regulation. It reconfigured the mechanisms for the 
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representation of Muslims vis a vis government, with the creation of ƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůDƵƐůŝŵtŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
Advisory Group and the Young Muslims Advisory Group in 2008, which bypassed existing Muslim 
representative structures to enable government to engage directly with Muslim women and youth. 
Through such means, as the Prevent strategy document declared, the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ aim was to: 
 ‘fundamentally rebalance our eŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?(DCLG, 2007a: 9). Prevent initiatives were facilitated by 
substantial funding. There were three government departments charged with delivering Prevent, 
each holding their own budget: the Home Office, particularly the OSCT; the DCLG; and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. Between 2008 and 2011, their combined Prevent funding came to 
£186,760 million.
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Tensions in the logics of engagement with Muslims under Prevent were evident from the start: on 
ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞ ŚĂŶĚ ? ƚŚĞ >' ?ƐPVE Guidance ŶŽƚĞĚ ĂŵŽŶŐ DƵƐůŝŵƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ  ‘a tiny minority who 
ŽƉƉŽƐĞ ƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ? ? but stated nevertheless that a  ‘key measure of success will be 
demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims ? (DCLG, 2007b: 7). Fairly soon after its inception, 
Prevent was subject to extensive criticism. In particular, critics argued that the focus on Muslims, the 
approach to community engagement through the prism of counter-terrorism and the overlap 
between Prevent and Community Cohesion policies securitised state engagement with Muslims 
(Thomas 2012 ? ĂŶĚ ĐĂƐƚ DƵƐůŝŵƐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?  ?WĂŶƚĂǌŝƐ ĂŶĚ WĞŵď ƌƚŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?
<ƵŶĚŶĂŶŝ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?Spooked, fuelled such perceptions by citing reports of Muslim youth and 
community workers being approached by intelligence services to provide information about the 
communities with whom they worked. This was denied by the government, with a Home Office 
DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ? sĞƌŶŽŶ ŽĂŬĞƌ ? ƉƌŽƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ P  ‘ĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ŝƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƐƉǇŝŶŐ ŽŶ Ɖeople or 
criminalising vulnerable communities are simply untrue, and only jeopardise the vital work of 
WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƚŽǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŬĞĞƉǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐƐĂĨĞ ĨƌŽŵƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐĞƌƐ ?  ?ĐŝƚĞĚ
Birt, 2009: 56). This claim was undermined however by subsequent statements by the architect of 
ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-terrorism strategy, David Omand, who in his testimony to the All Party 
Parliament Group on Homeland Security in 2010 observed:  
 ?z ?ŽƵ ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ĚŝǀŝĚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚǁŽ ? ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƉĞŽƉů ƚŚĂƚ ŐŽ around spying on the 
population, and there are another lot of people going round to [i.e. engaging with] the 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǇũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚƚĂůŬƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?/ƚũƵƐƚƐŝŵƉůǇĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ? ?ŝƚĞĚ
Thomas, 2012: 118) 
Suspicions about the rationale for Muslim engagement that was being pursued under Prevent 
proved difficult to dislodge. As a House of Commons Select Committee acknowledged, Prevent was 
ǁŝĚĞůǇ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ƐƉǇŝŶŐ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ǁŝƚŚ ŽŶĞ ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐŝŶŐ WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ĂƐ  ‘WƵƌƐƵĞ ŝŶ
ƐŚĞĞƉ ?Ɛ ĐůŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?  ?House of Commons, 2010: 8). The view that Prevent created highly securitised 
forms of community engagement appeared to be corroborated by the role of the OSCT in delivering 
Prevent, and the organisational overlap between security services and community engagement 
teams that occurred at the local level. In Birmingham, for instance, the Prevent programme there 
was led by a counter-terrorism police officer who had been seconded from the regional Counter 
dĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ hŶŝƚ  ?dh ? ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?Ɛ qualities Division. A local community activist in our 
study commented: 
Locally we ?ǀĞŚĂĚ ? Q ?ĂĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůŝƐƐƵĞǁŝƚŚĂƉŽůŝĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ  ? Q ? who was seconded into the 
Council. I can remember clearly very early on, members of ƚŚĞǇŽƵƚŚŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? Q ? said 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ǁŚǇ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ ŝƚ ?  ? Q ? ŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ĨŝƌƐƚ
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question they were posing to [him] was,  “This is security-led, intelligence-led. Otherwise you 
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞŚĞƌĞ ? ? 
Husband and Alam (2011) point out that the multi-agency nature of its delivery meant that on the 
ground Prevent came to permeate a wide range of policy areas. Consequently, as many argue, a host 
of policies, including integration, Cohesion and civil renewal policies, became problematically linked 
to counter-terrorism (Thomas, 2012). Many respondents in our study concurred with the belief that 
engagement conducted through Prevent was securitised, with concerns about political extremism 
displacing other issues. As one former advisor to the DCLG, AlveenĂ DĂůŝŬ ? ƚŽůĚ ƵƐ P  ‘Ğquality and 
diversity wasn ?t seen as an issue. It wasn ?t seen as certainly a solution. It was around how do we 
deradicalise? ? The contention that engagement through Prevent constituted a limited offer of 
participation was widely substantiated by respondents in our study. As Alveena Malik remarked 
 ‘there was this burden of responsibility and blame that we had to deal with which I found really 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ/ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ ? Q ?ƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƵƐǁŚŽĚŝĚŶ ?t toe the line ?ǁĞǁĞƌĞƐŚƵŶŶĞĚĂŶĚƐŝůĞŶĐĞĚ ? ?Birt 
(2009: 54) concludes that consequently within government there was an  ‘overemphasis upon 
counter-terrorism without engaging Muslims as citizens ? ? 
Prevent as a mode of disciplinary governance 
A significant body of critiĐĂů ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ŚĂƐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ǁĂǇƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ^ĐŚĞĚƵůĞ^ĞǀĞŶĂŶĚ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?5 policing powers enabled by prevention 
ŽĨ ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĞƌĞ ƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇĂŶĂƌƌĂǇŽĨ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂŶĚdiscursive 
interventions  W exemplified by Prevent  W that constituted a developing array of managerial 
techniques that sought to know, reform, and discipline British Muslims. A number of Foucauldian-
inspired readings have focused on the routine and pre-emptive ways in which government sought to 
inculcate discipline and  ‘self-governance ? among Muslims (Birt, 2008; McGhee, 2008; Heath-Kelly, 
2013; Martin, 2014), in Foucauldian terms: bringing together  ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨ with those of the 
practices of goverŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĞĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? Mavelli (2013) argues that state responses to terrorism 
ǁĞŶƚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ  ‘ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ŝŶ Ă ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞ ƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐ ŽĨ
 ‘ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?  ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?Drawing on actuarial 
techniques of governance (Miller and Rose, 2008), Heath-Kelly (2013) suggests that government 
adopted a pre-emptive approach to managing security risks within the counter-terrorism paradigm 
in which Muslims were constituted as simultaneously  ‘Ăƚ ƌŝƐŬ ?  ?ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐvulnerable to radicalisation) 
and  ‘risky ? (posing a security threat). This entailed a series of wide-ranging interventions in Muslim 
religious, social and civil structures, with the aim of reforming, managing and  ‘disciplining ?DƵƐůŝŵ
conduct. According to Heath-<ĞůůǇ ?ǁŚĂƚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ WƌĞǀĞŶƚǁĂƐ  ‘ĂŵŽƌĞ-or-less cohesive 
project of risk knowledge which [was] deployed to render terrorism pre-ĞŵƉƚŝǀĞůǇ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂďůĞ ?
(2013: 395).  
Birt (2008) argues that through Prevent, government developed an array of mechanisms for the 
disciplining of Muslim subjects, including: the deployment of a set of reductive distinctions between 
good/bad, moderate/extremist Muslims, creating a limited repertoire of subject positions for 
Muslims (and see McGhee, 2008); as well as attempts to mobilise the Muslim community as a whole 
in combating extremist ideology; the reform of  ‘conservative ? Muslim practices and Muslim 
institutions; and the promotion of mainstream, liberal Islam (2008: 27). Despite this, Birt (2008: 28-
9) observes Muslims have been  ‘successful in disrupting the application of governmentality ? by 
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acting above or below the nation-state  W through engagement in either autonomous grass roots 
organisations or global Muslim publics. Brown (2010) highlights a range of initiatives by British 
Muslims (such as the Muslim lifestyle and current affairs magazine Emel) that sought to present 
alternative perspectives on British Muslim identities and Islam in order to resist the subject positions 
offered to them by state discourses on Muslims, integration and security  W although these too were 
pursued outside of arenas of governance. Such perspectives seem to suggest that there has been 
little scope for Muslim actors to participate as autonomous or effective actors within governance. 
Prevent & governance in practice 
The logics and aims of Prevent have been highly problematic in terms of their positioning of Muslims 
as a security risk and poorly integrated into British society and the limited, and limiting, offers of 
engagement that have characterised participatory initiatives conducted under Prevent. However, we 
contend that the governance of Muslims through Prevent in practice has been less complete, and 
more contested, than many studies have allowed. KƵƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐŝƚin terms of 
 ‘ŶĞǁƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞŵŽĚĞƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƵďůŝĐ ?
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?'ƌŝŐŐƐĞƚĂů, 2014: 2 ? ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?
that is typified by vertically integrated forms of decision-making by public officials and political 
professionals. It is also distinct from the more expansive notion of governance that is prevalent in 
the governmentality literature, which focuses on a wide variety of state and extra-state agencies 
that seek to work on the conduct of individuals. In our critique of prevailing accounts of Prevent and 
governance, we highlight three conceptual and methodological issues that inform our perspective on 
its implications for state engagement with Muslims.  
Firstly, many studies of Prevent have focused on its discursive underpinnings through textual 
analysis of policy documents. More generally, McKee (2009: 473) identifies a tendency of many 
Foucauldian-inspired studies of governmentality ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘specific and 
concrete  ‘art of governing ? ? ƚŽ  ‘the rationales of governing as manifest in key (government) 
documents ? ?tŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨWƌĞǀĞŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐƐŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ DƵƐůŝŵ
engagement that are expressed in policy documents, should be analysed, we suggest there has been 
a neglect within the literature on Prevent of the material practices of governing (McKee, 2009: 473). 
With a few notable exceptions (Fussey, 2013; Husband and Alam, 2011; Lowndes and Thorp, 2010; 
Thomas, 2012), studies of Prevent and counter-terrorism policy have infrequently engaged with the 
practices, and conflicts, that have underscored the development and implementation of policy texts. 
Yet, and crucially, ĂƐDĐ<ĞĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?  ‘it is a mistake to  ‘read off ? consequences from governmental 
ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? Q ?ĨŽƌŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ? Q ? power always realises its effects ? (2009: 474). This is 
an important observation, and as our data show, through analysis of how actors interpreted, 
responded to or implemented Prevent, we see that the practices of Prevent did not always cohere 
with the aims of Prevent that were expressed in various policy documents.  
Secondly, many studies overemphasise the unity and coherence of governing strategies. Yet, as 
McKee (2009: 474 ? ŶŽƚĞƐ ?  ‘governmental programmes and strategies are themselves internally 
contradictory, continuously changing and capable of mutation ?. The dispersal of governing functions 
to a range of governance networks and partnerships over the last two decades, moreover, has 
created a highly differentiated governance terrain, with different government departments, 
networks and levels operating with different practices of governance ? Ɛ  ‘political fields ?, the 
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domains of governance are typically, following Swarz (2003: 151), arenas  ‘of conflict over the 
definition and implementation of public policies that are struggled over by political prŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ? ?
The implications of this are that governance is increasingly dispersed and often internally 
contradictory and contested, requiring study of the range of practices of governing across different 
governance domains. &ƵƐƐĞǇ ?Ɛ(2013) analysis of counter-terrorism policy is notable in drawing on a 
broader account of governmentality theory, in particular utilising &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
and the specific loci of security practices as an alternative to a reified panoptical state, to provide a 
conceptual tool to analyse the diversity and heterogeneity to be found within counter-terrorism 
practice (2013: 356). Taking this approach, he contends ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂƐ ŝƚ  ‘ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞĚ
ǁŝƚŚĚŝǀĞƌƐĞĂĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? Consequently, he questions both  ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
ambitions for control are realised and the degree of coherency within coalitions of [counter-
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ? ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P 356). Our own analysis supports this more heterogeneous reading of 
practices of governing through Prevent. 
Thirdly, inspired by a Foucauldian disciplinary analytical frame, studies of Prevent have tended to 
focus on governing power at the expense of agency. Despite the availability of a theoretical account 
of counter-ƉŽǁĞƌ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ?Bevir ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ
rarely examine agency as a source of discourses or as evidenced in specific instances of counter 
ƉŽǁĞƌ ?(2011: 462). This tendency is also noted by McKee, who suggests  ‘this preference to 
disregard messy empirical actualities results in a fundamental inability to account for why the 
governance subject, constituted through discourse, fails to turn up in practice ? (2009: 473-4). Yet, as 
McKee acknowledges, Foucauldian ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƐ ĐĂŶ ? ŝŶ &ƵƐƐĞǇ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ƚĞƌŵƐ ?
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞ ‘ĂŶĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐĚŝǀĞƌƐĞƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚŶŽŶ-state 
actors, and the way in which security practices aspire neither toǁĂƌĚƐƚŽƚĂůĐŽĞƌĐŝŽŶŽƌĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?. We 
argue, however, that much ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ ? ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ĐŽŵĞ ƚŽĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝse analyses of 
Prevent does not do justice to this fuller agency-incorporating sociology of governance. The need for 
a more complete account becomes particularly evident in the dispersed and multi-layered delivery 
of Prevent and in its reception across different levels of government and within Muslim civil society.  
A more practice-based approach to analysing state-citizen relations within governance spaces can 
reveal the possibilities for citizens to effect more autonomous agendas than those necessarily 
marked out for them by governors. Taking such an approach, Cornwall and Coelho ?s (2006) account 
of the responses of citizens who are invited into participatory governance spaces proposes that they 
should be seen as ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ‘ƐƉĂĐĞƐĨŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?because ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ‘invited spaces ?,  that 
are  ‘framed by those who create them, and infused with power relations and cultures of interaction 
carried into them from other spaces ? ? ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ  ‘also spaces of possibility, in which power takes a 
more productive and pŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĨŽƌŵ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ?Proceeding with this understanding of governance 
opens up theoretically the possibility that actors within governance spaces may adapt or change 
formal rules of governance in ways which may depart from institutional design  W sometimes with 
unintended consequences  W necessitating  ‘a larger role for contingency in understanding 
governance ? (Griggs at al, 2014: 9). Such an approach recognises the potential for the exercise of 
agency by different actors in reinterpreting, appropriating, contesting or resisting governance 
practices. 
Through a practice-oriented analysis of how Prevent was formulated, received and implemented, we 
advance an understanding of its implications for state-Muslim engagement as contested practice. In 
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ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ &ƵƐƐĞǇ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-terrorism surveillance measures, we show how 
Prevent was subject to contradictory and inconsistent logics and outcomes within government, and 
encountered modification, challenge and resistance  W both from state actors at national and local 
levels and from Muslim actors acting within and outside of governance arenas. The following 
sections set out the empirical basis to our argument. We begin by showing some of the 
contradictory logics of Prevent across government departments, and how these were met and 
contested by local authorities in different localities, before addressing responses by Muslim actors to 
the articulation and implementation of Prevent.  
Logics and practices of engagement across government 
One recurring issue that emerged in the critique of Prevent under New Labour was the blurring 
between Prevent and Community Cohesion policies. This was underpinned ideologically by the 
conviction that Cohesion was necessary for Prevent, and operationally by the overlap between the 
OSCT and the DCLG in the delivery of Prevent. Thus, each held its own Prevent budget, whilst the 
DCLG also assumed responsibility for the delivery of Community Cohesion policy. Actors within the 
OSCT and DCLG had, however, somewhat different conceptualisations of Muslim community 
engagement through Prevent  ?K ?dŽŽůĞ Ğƚ Ăů  ? ? ? ?). The view within the DCLG tended to see faith 
communities as resources in the delivery of Cohesion and welfare (Dinham and Lowndes, 2008), 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ŬĞǇ ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ĞŶŐĂŐĞ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ-to-ƌĞĂĐŚ ? ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
governance networks. As one senior advisor tŽƚŚĞ>' ?DĂƋƐŽŽĚŚŵĞĚ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŽƵƐ P ‘I was 
involved in the Prevent and when I say Prevent, it was less to do with the counter-terrorism, more to 
do with how do we establish connection with the Muslim community; how do we capacity build in 
the commuŶŝƚǇ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ǁĂǇƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞŶƚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ  ‘usual suspects ? who are always on the 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚĂďůĞ ? ?In contrast, a senior civil servant in the OSCT told us:  
In the early days, I had no idea that this job would involve community engagement. There 
were a few reasons for that: one, no-one had told me, and two, the organisation was new and 
we hadn ?t designed it into the principles. 
There was evidence of a turf-war between these departments in the delivery of Prevent, as the 
senior OSCT civil servant suggested:  
The DCLG regarded it as their job to have those contacts: to the point where they didn ?t 
particularly want us to have them. I think if truth be told, they were also slightly apprehensive 
that we would come in with size 12 security boots and sort of damage the contacts that they 
were creating. 
Ultimately, he suggested, the OSCT had used its power and resources to dominate the interpretation 
and delivery of Prevent:  
Because we arrived in a rather security-like way with a very determined delivery plan, 
occasionally people were just run off the court. They didn ?t have as much money. They didn ?t, 
frankly, have as much drive. They didn ?t quite know what they were doing. And it was hard. So 
what happened was Prevent took over Cohesion. 
Consequently, a fairly underdeveloped model of community engagement became increasingly 
ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ďǇ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ K^d ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ P  ‘We made a 
fundamental mistake three years ago with Prevent. I thought that we would be able to place Prevent 
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on top of a rich seam of dialogue with Muslim communities. My mistake was that that seam didn ?t 
exist ? ?ĐŚŽŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?Ăformer Secretary of State at the >' ?:ŽŚŶĞŶŚĂŵ ?ƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŽƵƐ P ‘I
found in the CLG, after some very rigorous examinations with officials, that there was no understood 
model of how Prevent was meant to work. ?dŚŝƐůĞĨƚWƌĞǀĞŶƚƉƌŽŶĞƚŽĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďǇƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂĐƚŽƌƐ
and issues  W but rather than driven by a unified, coherent governing project, this was an outcome of 
internal struggles between political professionals over its definition and implementation. 
This issue of overlap between Prevent and Cohesion, and the consequences of this for Cohesion, 
came to the fore in a House of Commons enquiry into Prevent, which recommended their future 
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨWƌĞǀĞŶƚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?
ǁŚŝĐŚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚŽǀĞƌůĂƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽŚĂĚ  ‘led to accusations that the government ?s 
interest in Muslim communities is related only to the risk of terrorism ? (Home Office, 2010). 
Subsequently, the revised Prevent strategy that was announced in June 2011 stipulated that Prevent 
and Cohesion would henceforth be separated  W with the Home Office leading Prevent and the DCLG 
leading Cohesion policy  W although as we discuss later, this separation is unlikely to be maintained in 
practice.  
 ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ƌĞǀŝƐĞĚ WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐŵ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐƚ ? DƵƐůŝŵ
groups and actors. New Labour ?s position on this question shifted. On the one hand, they 
condemned  ‘intolerant ? and extremist perspectives whilst seeking out and supporting  ‘moderate ?, 
 ‘mainstream ? Muslims. On the other hand, they attempted to differentiate between  ‘extremist ? and 
 ‘violent extremist ? positions in order to pragmatically engage with non-ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ  ‘extremist ? Islamist 
organisations (Birt, 2009: 54). One former Home Secretary (2004-6), Charles Clarke, in interview, 
confirmed that within the New Labour government there was little clarity or consensus on this issue: 
there was not a clear approach to what needed to be done, but there was a wide range of 
different views, there was confusion over some leaders of some of the communities and in 
particular, confusion about the extent to which we should, in any sense, compromise with 
some of the forces which have deep, deep, deep roots and a lack of appreciation of the nature 
of our democratic society in which we live [...] I do think it was an issue where we didn ?t have 
a coherence about what we thought was the right way of dealing with this question. 
This lack of clarity was confirmed by a former policy advisor to the DCLG, Francis Davis, who 
commented that ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ  ‘no real kind of clear basis upon which one can decide who ?s in and 
who ?s out. So you get Hazel [Blears] throwing MCB6 out and you get John [Denham] and the team 
working ǀĞƌǇŚĂƌĚƚŽŐĞƚ ƚŚĞŵďĂĐŬ ŝŶ ? ? /ŶŚŝƐƐƉĞĞĐŚƚŽƚŚĞDƵŶŝĐŚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽŶĨĞƌĞnce in 2011, 
David Cameron signalled a hardened stance on this issue, declaring:  ‘instead of ignoring this 
extremist ideology, we  W as governments and as societies  W have got to ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝƚ ?ŝŶĂůůŝƚƐĨŽƌŵƐ ? 
(Cameron, 2011). Cameron ?s  ‘muscular liberalism ? has ostensibly prevailed in the new Prevent 
strategy in its stipulation that government will no longer engage with  ‘extrĞŵŝƐƚƐ ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐnon-
violent extremists (that is, non-violent Islamists or Salafis), who do not subscribe to core liberal 
values (Home Office, 2011: 23-4). This stance, however, has not been shared by other Ministers in 
the Coalition, with divisions crossing party lines (Oborne, 2011), nor has it been shared by key civil 
servants within the OSCT, as one senior officer told us at the time of the Prevent review: 
I don ?t want to be dealing with extremism per se anywhere. I don ?t think it ?s right for us as a 
counter-terrorism team to be doing that. [...] Extremism isn ?t illegal in this country and we ?re 
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not the right people to deal with that. We must get involved where extremism is leading 
people on the road to terrorism. 
Indeed, our study found there was significant scepticism over whether this stipulation can be 
implemented. As one Muslim advisor to the Home Office recounted to us in late 2012: 
I just went to a meeting two weeks ago and the Home Office is still working with those groups. 
 ? Q ? ŝĨ ǇŽƵǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƌĞĂĐŚŚĂƌĚůŝŶĞ^ĂůĂĨŝ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǇŽƵŚĂǀĞ ƚŽǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚŚĂƌĚůŝŶĞ^ĂůĂĨŝ
people, that ?s just the way it is. You ?re not going to reach them through cuddly Sufis. There ?s a 
sense of realpolitik about this whole thing. 
Such conflicts over core issues relating to the rationale of Prevent contributed to a sense that 
Prevent was unfocused (Birt, 2009), and consequently, less cohesive than often imagined. This was a 
ĐŚĂƌŐĞ ůĞǀĞůůĞĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ Ăƚ EĞǁ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? tŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ strategy lays out a 
stronger line on eschewing non-ůŝďĞƌĂů ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐƚ ?ŐƌŽƵƉƐĂŶĚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽŵŽďŝůŝƐĞĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĨƌŽŶƚ-line 
services (including charities, universities and health services) in pre-emptively responding to 
extremism, in practice this stance is also less coherent than it appears, as we discuss below. 
Local reception and implementation of Prevent 
Perceptions of the unfocussed nature of Prevent under Labour were very prevalent at the local level. 
In part, this was encouraged by the somewhat open-ended nature of Prevent guidance, which gave 
local authorities leeway to interpret and implement Prevent as they saw fit. As John Denham (2013), 
later reflected:  ‘With no clear national guidance on forging allies against terrorism, mistakes were 
ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞ  ? Q ? ĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ ? WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ĚŝĚ ŐŽŽĚ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ ĂƌĞĂƐ where people worked through the 
challenges for themselvĞƐ ?. Local Authorities often reworked Prevent to fit local priorities, and, as 
Lowndes and Thorp show, local contexts were important in shaping the outcomes of Prevent  W 
ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĚĞďĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ  ‘ƚŽƉ-ĚŽǁŶ ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞr of the 
ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?>ŽǁŶĚĞƐĂŶĚdŚŽƌƉĂůƐŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞand often surprising interplay ? 
between central strategies and local agency (ibid) in their study of the implementation of the 
Prevent Pathfinder programme of 2007-8 in three Midlands cities, which served as the pilot phase of 
the Prevent programme that followed. They found that models of community engagement varied 
significantly across the three cities  W from community safety, community cohesion to community 
development approaches  W reflecting their different logics, histories and pre-existing structures of 
community engagement.  
Prevent was met with considerable opposition by many local authorities, as other studies have 
documented (Thomas, 2012). In particular, several local authorities in areas that were targeted for 
Prevent funding were reluctant to adopt National Indicator 35 (NI35)  W ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
assessment framework for monitoring resilience to violent extremism. As the minutes of a Local 
Government AssociatiŽŶ ?>' ?ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ P ‘>ŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚƚŽƉŝĐŬƵƉ
ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐŵ ? ĐŽƵůĚ ĂůŝĞŶĂƚĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ
ĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶǁŽƌŬĂŶĚĂƌĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐĂďŽƵƚŵĂŬŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌŽƵŶĚWs ? ?Đited Khan, 
2009: 8). Husband and Alam ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?1) study of Prevent in West Yorkshire found that it encountered 
 ‘ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ĨƌŽŵ ůŽĐĂů ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ǁŝƚŚ ŽŶĞ ƐĞŶŝŽƌ ĐŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐƚƵĚǇ
ĚĞŶŽƵŶĐŝŶŐ WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ĂƐ  ‘ƌĂĐŝƐƚ ?  ? ? ? ?1: 147). In Bradford, the Council initially refused to accept 
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Prevent funding, but did eventually although, as a former Conservative Bradford council leader, Kris 
Hopkins, explained to us, not to implement Prevent objectives: 
And so you ended up with a situation where we [BrĂĚĨŽƌĚŽƵŶĐŝů ?ǁĞƌĞŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ? Q ?ƚƌǇŝŶŐ
to gain the confidence of a very fragile community
7
 through PR interventions around 
Community Cohesion, and at the same time we were being asked to be an arm of the security 
services, to respond under the direction of the NI35 directives.  And we just refused to play.  
And they said well you can ?ƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ WƌĞǀĞŶƚŵŽŶĞǇ ƵŶůĞƐƐ ǇŽƵ ƉůĂǇ ? ƐŽǁĞƐĂŝĚ  ? Qkeep 
your Prevent money, we ?ll spend our own reserves to do more Community Cohesion work.  
And eventually they  gave us the Prevent money anyway... 
Across our three local case study areas of Leicester, Tower Hamlets and Birmingham, we found 
considerable variation in the ways in which Prevent was conceptualised, received and implemented 
under New Labour. Significantly, wĞ ĨŝŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞǀŝƐĞĚ
Prevent strategy  W despite attempts to enforce a more focused and centralised approach.  
In Leicester, when Prevent was launched in 2007, the local council refused to accept the terminology 
of PƌĞǀĞŶƚ ? ƌĞďƌĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŝƚ  ‘Mainstreaming Moderation ? ? >ĂƌŐĞůǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŚŽƐƚ ƚŽ Ă ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
Gujarati population with significant numbers of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, local governance in 
Leicester has since the 1990s had a strong multi-faith ethos, which WƌĞǀĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ
Muslims placed at risk (Open Society Institute, 2010). To mitigate this, the strategy was reconceived 
to include all forms of extremism  W despite local perceptions of opposition to this from central 
government. In 2011, the elected mayor went further, refusing to accept a Home Office funded 
Prevent Officer within the Council. This led to Prevent being co-ordinated by a local Church-led 
multi-faith centre, St Philips Centre ? ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ DƵƐůŝŵ ƵŵďƌĞůůĂ ďody, the 
&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDƵƐůŝŵKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?^ƚWŚŝůŝƉ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ?   ?). ^ƚWŚŝůŝƉ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĞŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ
significant non-governmental bodies in Leicester. With a background in Cohesion work, it currently 
ĚĞůŝǀĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ ŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨůĂŐƐŚŝƉ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ Ɖrogramme, Near Neighbours. It is thus unlikely that 
Prevent and Cohesion can or will be separated in Leicester as the new Prevent strategy directs. 
/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĞŶƚƌĞ ?ƐŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ P ‘ŝf you are going to tackle issues of extremism 
you have actually got to address issues of integration as well. The reality is they do belong together ? ?
wŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĞƉƵƚǇ ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ P  ‘^ƚ WŚŝůůŝƉ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ŝƐ ĂŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂƐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ŝƚƐ
reputation on interfaith relationships. The Home Office knows that and is happy with that. What 
ŽƚŚĞƌŽƉƚŝŽŶĚŝĚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ ?ǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚĂƌŐƵĞ ? ?/ŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶ>ĞŝĐĞƐƚĞƌŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐĂĐůŽƐĞ
relationship with Cohesion. 
In Tower Hamlets, the local council was initially cautious, but not hostile, towards Prevent. Its 
implementation of Prevent tended to place strong emphasis on projects with a Community Cohesion 
orientation, with 24/28 projects focused on broad Cohesion aims rather than more security-related 
issues (Iacopini et al, 2011). Following the launch of the revised Prevent strategy, projects proposed 
by Tower Hamlets in 2012 were rejected ďǇ ƚŚĞ ,ŽŵĞ KĨĨŝĐĞ ĂƐ ƚŽŽ  ‘CŽŚĞƐŝŽŶ ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ? ?
Nevertheless, Tower Hamlets council has been pursuing its own locally-shaped projects  W such as the 
 ‘No Place for Hate ? programme, which excludes extremist preachers, but emphasises local cohesion 
in the face of threats from far right  W and therefore overlap remains. Significantly, Tower Hamlets 
also opted out of the Channel programme  W setting up its own programme that is accountable to 
local authority and policing structures rather than directly to SO15 (the counter-terrorism command 
within the Metropolitan Police). Despite central governmenƚ ?Ɛ ďĂƌ on working with Islamists, in 
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Tower Hamlets the East London Mosque (ELM), often vilified from outside as an Islamist mosque, 
maintains its position as a key institution locally. It is deeply embedded in local governance networks 
and the largest non-governmental provider of local services. Thus, it would be difficult, indeed 
counter-productive, for local government to disengage from the ELM. 
In Birmingham, the city council initially implemented Prevent with cooperation from some Muslim 
organisations. But, perceptions that Prevent was police-led arose quite early on, not least, as noted 
above, because of the secondment of a counter-terrorism police officer into the council ?s equalities 
division to lead Prevent. By 2010, suspicion towards Prevent had intensified as a consequence of 
 ‘Project Champion ?. Whilst not itself a Prevent initiative, Project Champion did much to undermine 
the implementation of Prevent in the city. Project Champion was a police surveillance operation 
involving installation of 216 CCTV and ANPR (overt and covert) cameras in two areas of Muslim 
settlement, creating a  ‘surveillance ring ? around these areas. Importantly, the counter-terrorism 
purpose of the cameras was concealed from local residents, and the cameras were badged as a 
 ‘crime ƐĂĨĞƚǇŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ǁŝƚŚůŝƚƚůĞ ?ĂŶĚĚĞĞƉůǇflawed, community consultation. Furthermore, Fussey 
(2013) found serious divergences among the coalition of security professionals involved in Project 
Champion, in terms of their knowledge of and support for the project. The true purpose of Project 
Champion was revealed by civil society campaigners (Jolly, 2011) with damaging implications for 
Prevent. By the time Prevent was revised and re-launched in 2011, there were very high levels of 
suspicion towards Prevent, with few projects underway, such that in the words of one of our 
interviewees,  ‘Prevent is dead in this city ?. 
At the local level, then, there were differing perceptions of Prevent, with implications for its 
reception, delivery and impact, with local actors modifying, challenging and resisting Prevent, such 
that in practice it varied from one locality to another and often diverged from centrally articulated 
policy. 
Muslim civil society responses to Prevent 
A third much-neglected area in the study of the implications of Prevent has been the responses of 
Muslim civil society actors to the models of community engagement developed through Prevent. 
Our study uncovered a range of responses, from qualified cooperation, to appropriation of aspects 
of Prevent (including funding) for more autonomous objectives, to participating after renegotiating 
the terms of engagement offered by government, to challenge, protest and exit. Many actors shifted 
positions across these range of responses. 
A very common response of Muslim organisations and actors was a simple refusal to engage with 
Prevent. Birt (2009), for example, reports that the Lancashire Council of Mosques refused funding 
because the scope of Contest 2 was too broad in its focus on Muslims in general. This objection was 
a very common one, and increasingly augmented by widespread suspicion of Prevent as a 
surveillance programme (Husband and Alam, 2011). Thus, even some Muslims who might have 
welcomed the funding that Prevent provided were dissuaded from engaging with Prevent because 
of its stigmatising associations and fears about its covert aims. There were also Muslim groups and 
organisations that had engaged with the relatively more open-ended Pathfinder programme in 
2007-8, but decided against participating in any further Prevent activity  W despite the possibilities 
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that such a tranche of funding might enable. As one member of a Muslim organisation, the Cordoba 
Foundation in London, which had been a recipient of Prevent funding, commented: 
I won ?t touch [Prevent funding] with a two metre bar and no-one will. No-one of any decency 
will and that ?ƐĂďŝŐproblem. That ?s a huge problem because we ought to be [making use of 
funding]. This is public funds for the public good. Why aren ?t we using it? We can ?t because 
now it ?s poisoned. 
Some who had engaged during the Pathfinder year, had done so with reluctance, but had also 
sought to renegotiate the terms of their engagement, as Humera Khan, in discussing the 
involvement of her community organisation, An-Nisa Society, explained: 
we took money in the Pathfinder year. We were persuaded by our youth service and diversity 
team, because they didn ?t have anybody else who had the ability to run a project. [...] We said 
we would only do it on the condition that it ?s not sold as a Prevent project. We ?re not going to 
do Prevent work, we ?re going to do community development [...] we want it to be as a basis to 
start a dialogue with you as a council... ?  
Subsequently, however, An-Nisa refused to engage any further with Prevent, and published a highly 
critical report arguing that Prevent ǁĂƐĨůĂǁĞĚŽŶĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŐƌŽƵŶĚƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ P  ‘ŝƚƐƚĂƌŐĞƚŝŶŐŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ DƵƐůŝŵ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ĂƐ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚƐ ? ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ĨƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ǁŝƚŚ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ? ‘ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶŐŽĨWƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ
core ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŽĨůŽĐĂůĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ? ?ŝƚƐ ‘ŚĞĂǀǇƐƵƌǀĞŝůůĂŶĐĞĨŽĐƵƐ ? ?ŝƚƐ ‘ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŶŐĂŶĚƵŶĐůĞĂƌ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƚŚĞ
ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŝůů ĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚ ĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ? ŝŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞ  ‘ŝŶ Ă ŚŝŐŚůǇ ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĂƌĞĂ ? ? ƚŚĞ ůŽƐƐ ŽĨ
credibility and trust incurred by those grass roots Muslim groups who accepted Prevent funding; and 
the lack of concerted government action on tackling social exclusion among Muslims (Khan, 2009: 4-
5). 
Several organisations used their expertise and positions as gatekeepers to particular groups as 
negotiation tools to insist on their own terms of engagement. As Abdul Haqq Baker, the organiser of 
the STREET (Strategy to Reach Empower and Educate Teenagers) project in Brixton explained: 
STREET, I think, became a very powerful tool to show the effective engagement and 
partnership, especially partnership, with Government entities, whether they be local or 
central, and NGO institutions was possible. But the key area here was that it was negotiated 
on equal terms. There were some terms that I would not accept from lŽĐĂůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ? Q ?Ğ ?Ő ?
the police and other statutory organisations saying you need to inform them and provide 
reports on your target audience. I said I won ?t do that, that ?s not going to happen, and I ?m 
prepared to walk away from any agreement on that basis, because of the confidentiality, 
because of the credibility that wĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? 
In other areas, there were cases of more open confrontation and protest against certain counter-
terrorism measures. In Birmingham, this was particularly manifested in the campaign against 
 ‘Project Champion ? ƚŚĂƚ ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŶĂŵĞBirmingham Against Spy Cameras (BASC). This was a 
concerted, successful grass-roots campaign by Muslim and non-Muslim activists to identify and 
dismantle the cameras. Their action forced a public apology from West Midlands Police, followed by 
the hooding of the cameras and ultimately their removal (and see Fussey 2013). 
A number of activists in our study who had worked with government on Prevent had voiced their 
objections to the logics or practices of Prevent, with many withdrawing from engagement with 
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Prevent or Channel or other counter-terrorism initiatives that sought Muslim cooperation. We found 
a range of exit strategies. For instance, one Muslim mentor in Birmingham who had been working 
with the OSCT on the Channel programme quietly withdrew from the scheme because he felt unable 
ƚŽ ƐŝŐŶ ƵƉ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů sĂůƵĞƐ ? ĨŽƌŵ ?8 Other exit strategies were more public and openly 
challenging. An-EŝƐĂ ?ƐĞǆŝƚĨƌŽŵWƌĞǀĞŶƚ was, as noted above, accompanied by the publication of a 
highly critical report. Similarly, a prominent member of the government-established National Muslim 
tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ'ƌŽƵƉ ?^ŚĂŝƐƚĂ'ŽŚŝƌ ?resigned from the group and issued a public denunciation 
of the Brown government ?Ɛapproach to engaging with Muslim women (Gohir, 2010). We found 
instances of actors exiting Prevent and attempting to establish their own alternative initiatives, 
including an attempt by community activists in Birmingham to establish an alternative, autonomous 
Muslim self-organised Prevent programme, which eschewed government funding or involvement 
and was distinctive in its critical focus on both UK foreign policy and al-YĂĞĚĂ ?ƐŝĚĞŽlogy and tactics.  
Conclusion 
In this article, we have focused on the implications of state engagement with Muslims through the 
prism of Prevent. We opened by identifying tensions between two conceptualisations of 
governance: one as a disciplinary mode of regulation and the other as contested practice. In the 
literature, the former is pervasive. Undeniably, much of the logic of Prevent has been disciplinary in 
its aims and as such, this has had enormous symbolic and discursive effect. Nevertheless, we suggest 
that the latter is also in operation, as attending empirically to how different actors responded to 
Prevent reveals: its policy logics were often inconsistent, whilst its practices were messier and more 
contested than many studies have allowed. Engaging with ideas of practice opens up the possibility 
that whilst the state may initiate engagement in problematic ways and with limited offers of 
participation, actors across governance arenas may not necessarily comply with these logics of 
engagement. As such, we contest the view that Prevent can be seen straightforwardly as a form of 
discipline given its contradictory, incoherent, and contested practice. 
EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?WƌĞǀĞŶƚĚŝĚƵŶĚĞƌǁƌŝƚĞǁŚĂƚƌĐŚĞƌĐŝƚĞƐĂƐĂ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨƵŶĞĂƐĞ ?ĂƌŽƵŶĚDƵƐůŝŵƐŝŶ
British society, which, following Huysmans and Buonfino, ŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ĂƐĂ ‘ƉĂƚĐŚǁŽƌŬŽĨ
insecurities that facilitate the poliĐǇ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ĨĞĂƌƐ ĂŶĚ ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ? ĂĐƌŽƐƐ Ă ƌĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
ĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ ? ^ƵĐŚ  ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ? ĂƐ ŝƌƚ  ? ? ? ? ?: 57 ? ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ŽƵƚ ?  ‘ĂŶ
ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĨŝƌĞǁĂůů ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶWƌĞǀĞŶƚĂŶĚWƵƌƐƵĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐůĂŵĂŶĚ,ƵƐďĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞ ?ƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝ-
agency nature of delivery enabled such permeation, whilst prior to 2010 the operational overlap 
between Prevent and Cohesion carried security concerns over into the implementation of Cohesion 
and integration strategies. As our data show, in these circumstances, where there were asymmetric 
relations between the OSCT and the DCLG, security issues overrode other concerns and approaches 
 W but this was not based necessarily on a consensual understanding of Prevent. Further, we have 
argued, Prevent was rejected, modified, contested and opposed by Muslim civil society and 
governance actors on the ground. Under the new strategy, Prevent and Cohesion have, in policy 
terms at least, been separated (although we suggested in practice this separation is incomplete). 
However, ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƌWƌĞǀĞŶƚ ƚŽ ůĞĂĐŚ ŝŶƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƉŽůŝĐǇĂƌĞĂƐĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŶĞǁƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?Ɛ
focus on institutions and sectors and its goal to charge front-line personnel in schools, universities, 
health services and charities with Prevent delivery. Whilst it is likely that Prevent will continue to be 
patchy, contested and/or resisted by governance actors, professionals
9
 and citizens within those 
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ƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞ  ‘Ă ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ ĨĞĂƌƐ ĂŶĚ ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?
across goǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ Ă  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ƵŶĞĂƐĞ ? ĂďŽƵƚ DƵƐůŝŵƐ ŝŶ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ
society. 
                                                          
1
 This project was part of the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society programme: 
http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/  
2
 For a full list of interviewees see K ?dŽŽůĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƉĞŶĚŝǆ ? ? 
3
 The study operated a strategy of differential disclosure, where respondents were given the option of being 
reported by name, general role, anonymously or not reported/cited directly at all, and in relation to all or parts 
of their interview data. 
4
 Between 2008 and 2011, the DCLG budget for Prevent was £66.760 million according to a detailed response 
by the DCLG to a Freedom of Information request in 2011: see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-funding. Between 2009-2011, Home Office funding 
came to £84 million, whilst FCO funding came to £36 million: see Home Office (2011). 
5
 These provisions grant the authorities the power to stop, search and hold individuals without the need to 
provide grounds. 
6
 Founded in 1997, tŚĞDƵƐůŝŵŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?D ?ŝƐƚŚĞh< ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƵŵďƌĞůůĂŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ.  
7
 This is a reference to the 2001 disturbances in Bradford (and the nearby towns of Burnley and Oldham), 
which were characterised as ethnic conflicts that stemmed from patterns of segregation among Asian and 
white communities. 
8
 Mentors participating in Channel were required to sign a Statement of Individual Values form that included 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƉƵƚĂƚŝǀĞŵĞŶƚŽƌ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĞƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞ ?
ŚŽŵŽƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞƚŚŶŝĐĂŶĚƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƉůƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶƚƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŶĚ ‘ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĂƌŵĞĚƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ against British 
troops oveƌƐĞĂƐ ? ? 
9
 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂŶĞǁƉŽůŝĐǇ ‘ŝƐƐƵĞĚďǇE,^ŶŐůĂŶĚƚŽĂůůŚĞĂůƚŚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘'W
practices must train a lead member of staff to recognise patients who could become or have become linked to 
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ?ƚŚĞĐŚĂŝƌŽĨƚŚĞZŽǇĂůŽůůĞŐĞŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂůWƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐƐƚĂƚĞĚ P ‘/ƚŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞ
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